Brief
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Auf einen Blick
The past few years have been among the most volatile in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry’s history. A glut in 2020 gave way to three supply shocks in five years: Europe’s loss of Russian pipeline gas in 2022, drought on the Panama Canal that began in 2023, and this year’s Strait of Hormuz situation. As industry leaders navigate the latest supply crunch, they face an uncomfortable reality: Another glut looms, and it will be much harsher than the last one. The next glut, which we expect to last from about 2030 to 2034 (depending on how the Gulf crisis plays out), could erase LNG trading profits. We forecast that this profit pool—earned by intermediating LNG between suppliers and end users through spot and short-term deals and resold long-term volumes—will nearly break even at best and most likely will turn negative. That’s a sharp reversal from the $20 billion or more in annual gross trading profits during recent disruptions. How we got hereThe decisions that led here were rational in isolation. With each shock, buyers rightly wanted supply flexibility, and contracts that let them send cargoes anywhere looked like a cheap safeguard. So, they signed for more than they needed, figuring they could resell any surplus. From 2022 through 2025, they signed long-term contracts (15 years or more) worth a combined 211 million tonnes (Mt) per year of LNG, more than half from US projects and many on free-on-board (FOB) terms. Meanwhile, spot and short-term deals rose from 34% of global LNG trade in 2019 to 43% in 2025, according to GIIGNL data. But resale only works if someone else is short. Many buyers bought first and worked out the exit later. The logic now runs upstream, too: Developers can reach a final investment decision on offtake from a creditworthy portfolio owner or trader, without end users locked in; such businesses took about 35% of the volume disclosed in 2025. With everyone assuming someone else will find the buyers, the market develops a more severe glut. The supply map is also changing: The cheapest LNG and the most reliable LNG no longer come from the same source. Qatar, one of the lowest-cost suppliers, has proved fragile, while newcomers such as Canada offer security on short routes to Asia. This year’s crunch has only delayed the glut. Even counting only plants already operating or under construction, liquefaction capacity utilization falls from an estimated 90% today to below 75% from 2030 to 2034, according to Bain & Company’s IntersectSM model (see Figure 1). That’s about as deep as the previous glut, but we expect it will last five years, not one. Planned capacity would make it worse. Contracts signed for security will be delivered into a buyer’s market.
Figure 1
Notes: 2026 data is an estimate; all future years are forecasts Sources: GIIGNL; Bain Intersect; Bain analysisThe rise of the “accidental” traderSupply flexibility has had another effect: turning buyers into traders. Three forces are behind the trend.
Japan, long a buyer rather than a trader, shows how far this has gone. In fiscal 2024, Japanese companies handled about 110 Mt of LNG but consumed only 66 Mt, according to survey data from the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security. They resold abroad the other 44 Mt—approximately 40% of the LNG they handled that year. That was an annual record and nearly three times the 2018 level, with the increase coming from contracted volumes. Traditional importers in China, India, and Turkey are moving into trading as well, and midsize European utilities are building LNG portfolios of their own. More competitors are crowding in, from national oil companies to banks and hedge funds drawn by the volatility. Singapore alone hosted more than 60 LNG traders in 2025, up from about 40 in 2017. Trading activity is rising, too. Spot and short-term trade has more than doubled, from 78 Mt in 2017 to 183 Mt in 2025. One cargo for August 2025 delivery was reportedly traded 46 times. More traders, less profitIntermediaries are paid for five things: flexibility, logistics, holding long-term volumes and reselling them over shorter terms, absorbing the gap between the index they buy on and the one they sell on, and taking on the credit risk in deals between creditworthy sellers and weaker buyers. As customers become competitors, more firms offer these services and fewer need to buy them. Margins on flexibility, logistics, and credit will shrink first. The remaining margin comes from managing mismatches in contract length and pricing index, which can pay in a shock but cost in a glut. The industry has seen both sides. Before 2020, LNG traders earned about $5.5 billion a year in gross profit, roughly $2 million per traded cargo. In the 2020 glut, traders earned about $4.2 billion in gross profit, but buyers paid about $1.7 billion to cancel some 175 US cargoes, for a net $2.5 billion. In the 2022–23 shock, gross trading profits rose to about $22 billion, roughly $6 million per cargo, most of it from carrying risk rather than providing services. The current crunch is lifting gross trading profits again, to an estimated $20 billion for 2026. But during the next glut, traders as a whole will almost break even at best, according to our analysis (see Figure 2). From 2030 through 2034, more than twice as much LNG will be traded as before 2020, but each cargo may earn only about $1 million, half the pre-2020 level. That adds up to about $5.5 billion in gross profits, the same as before the 2020 glut. However, that’s before cancellation losses. Holders of Henry Hub–linked FOB volumes also still pay the liquefaction fee on cargoes they can’t place, about $9 million per cargo. If sanctioned production capacity arrives on time, about one in six US cargoes would go unlifted, and those fees alone would cost about $5.8 billion a year. Cargoes lifted and sold below cost would add further losses. And if 20% of planned (but not yet sanctioned) capacity also comes online, even a year behind schedule, it erases another $1.5 billion.
Figure 2
Notes: Profit pool is the gross margin that intermediaries earn buying LNG at the plant gate (including liquefaction fees on FOB volumes) and selling it to end users, before operating costs; losses count only the fixed liquefaction fee on canceled US cargoes (about $9 million per cargo), whose contracts are more commonly cancelable; excludes US cargoes lifted and sold below full cost, oil-linked cargoes resold below contract price, and take-or-pay on other supply, so losses are conservative Sources: GIIGNL; IGU; S&P Global Energy Platts; Bain Intersect; Bain analysisMuch of that downside won’t show up in reported trading profits. Some traders booked onerous-contract charges on US offtake in 2020, and others strip fair-value swings out of their adjusted results. Today’s LNG crunch may be traders’ last windfall before the glut. As the windfall fades and service margins shrink, breaking even in aggregate will hide a wide spread. Books matched or hedged in timing and price will keep much of their margin. Whoever holds US volume they can’t place, whether a portfolio holder with an open position or a buyer contracted beyond its own needs, will pay the bill. Matching isn’t a given, though. It requires the right contracts and balance sheet, and, importantly, the customers to keep taking the cargoes even in a glut. Those with scale, surplus outlets, a strong balance sheet, and an information edge will gain ground. A new service model may also emerge. In renewable power, many asset owners no longer sell their own output; they hand it to aggregators that pool many producers’ volumes, manage the price risk, and pass back a share of the value. In LNG, established merchant traders are well placed to offer the same, taking on smaller players’ surplus for a fee or a share of the upside, rather than buying the cargoes outright. Consolidation is also likely through the glut. The industry has seen it before. Winning in the crowded middleThere are no safe havens left in the increasingly crowded middle of the LNG market.
Winning in a crowded middle starts with five questions. Strategy and business model: What do you bring that others can’t replicate easily? The most successful companies will start with their core advantages and test today’s strategy against a 2030–34 buyer’s market. They’ll choose the business model that matches where their assets, outlets, and balance sheet give a real edge, whether that’s holding, trading, or aggregating others’ surplus, creating demand downstream, or handing their own surplus to someone better placed. Risk appetite: Does it match what your chosen model needs? It will be imperative to agree at the board level how many uncontracted cargoes the company can feasibly carry, how many it could cancel or resell at a loss, the level of acceptable earnings volatility and collateral, and how concentrated to be on one index, route, or counterparty. Monitor exposures against scenarios in real time, not at month-end. Operating model: Are you organized for the business model? In our experience working with LNG companies worldwide, the most effective organizations separate industrial portfolio management, which secures the volumes the core business needs, from short-term optimization, which trades the flexibility around that plan in pursuit of additional revenue. They give each side its own mandate, limits, and transfer price, as well as origination, scheduling, shipping, and independent risk controls. And they reward the people who create value, analysts and technologists included. Technology: Can your systems carry the ambition? Trading multiplies positions, counterparties, price formulas, and contract options. Legacy architecture and systems built for procurement tend to get bogged down in spreadsheets and manual workarounds that slow decisions and weaken control. Successful traders keep the core trading system lean and put the analytics that set them apart on a shared data layer. AI: Where will it give you an edge? It won’t be where everyone else is looking. Some trading-desk AI will become table stakes. The edge comes from applying AI to what only you have—whether plants, contracts, customers, or ships—and linking it to how you trade. The most successful AI adopters start small and scale only what pays back. Today’s supply crunch buys time to adaptLNG companies that use the current shortage to reset strategy, risk appetite, operating model, and technology systems will own the crowded middle when the glut arrives. When the bill comes due, the rest will discover they were only traders with no real advantages.
IntersectIntersect, Bain’s global energy and carbon modeling capability, helps executives identify opportunities and risks in energy and materials markets with scenario-based outlooks tailored to specific use cases and based on best-in-class market data and technology cost data across industries and regions. |